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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Many secured creditors have decided that Chapter 11 is the place 
to be to liquidate their collateral. Judge Thomas Ambro of the Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals recently explained  
 
11 U.S.C. § 363 allows a debtor to sell substantially all 
of its assets outside a plan of reorganization. In modern 
bankruptcy practice, it is the tool of choice to put a quick 
close to a bankruptcy case. It avoids time, expense, and, 
some would say, the Bankruptcy Code’s unbending 
rules.1 
 
Judge Ambro should know what he’s speaking about: he’s the 
author of some of the most important bankruptcy law decisions of the 
Third Circuit since he joined the bench,2 he is the former head of the 
Business Law Section of the American Bar Association,3 and he 
practiced bankruptcy law in Delaware – an important venue for large 
Chapter 11 cases4 – before he became a judge.5 
But just because secured creditors want to use bankruptcy to 
liquidate their collateral does not mean, however, that they want to bear 
the costs: in other words, they oftentimes don’t want to pay-to-play. 
Instead, they usually cut a deal in the first month of a bankruptcy case 
designed to protect themselves from bearing the costs of liquidating their 
collateral in Chapter 11. Oftentimes the deal includes the requirement 
that their collateral be sold swiftly, in a going concern sale. Indeed, 
reported cases increasingly reflect secured creditors apparently choosing 
Chapter 11 but purposefully walking away from the costs of estate 
                                                          
1 In re LCI Holding Co., 802 F.3d 547, 549 (3d Cir. 2015). 
2 E.g., In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting substantive 
consolidation of claims of secured creditors is akin to communism); In re 
Philadelphia Newspapers, 599 F.3d 298, 321 (3d Cir. 2010) (Ambro, J. 
dissenting) (secured creditors have right to credit bid under § 1129(b)(1)). 
3 Member Spotlight: An Interview with Judge Thomas Ambro (2015), available 
at www.americanbar.org/publications/bit/2015/10/member_spotlight.html. 
4 Jared A. Wilkerson, Defending the Current State of Section 363 Sales, 86 Am. 
Bankr. L. J. 591, 599 (2012) (noting large percentage of Chapter 11 cases of 
debtors with greater than $100 million in assets in 1980 dollars filed in 
Delaware between 1982 and 2011). 
5 E.g., In re Marvel Ent. Group Inc., 234 B.R. 21 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999) 
(appearing as counsel to secured creditors). 
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Issue 1  Paying-To-Play in Chapter 11 115 
administration.6 This article argues that secured creditors should pay-to-
play in Chapter 11. In short, if secured creditors choose to liquidate their 
collateral in Chapter 11, they must pay all administrative expenses unless 
the estate has other available assets to meet those expenses. 
In this article, I develop ideas initially proposed in my article, 
Chapter 11 Zombies, in which I described the increasing number of 
Chapter 11 dismissals in which distributions are made to secured 
creditors in a manner contrary to the explicit priority and equality of 
treatment rules of the Code. Herein, I develop some of the concerns I 
identified in Chapter 11 Zombies and suggest that the most appropriate 
way to discourage Chapter 11 distributions that violate the Chapter 11 
distribution schemes is to forbid the entry of orders at the outset of a case 
that absolve secured creditors of their obligations under sections 506(c) 
and 552(a) of Chapter 11. These orders oftentimes have the practical 
effect, of allowing secured creditors to dictate who gets paid and in what 
amount in the chapter 11 case. 
The good news is that the Bankruptcy Code does not have to be 
amended to provide for this fundamentally fair result. The Code already 
has two provisions that, properly interpreted, require the secured creditor 
pay-to-play. Those sections are Code sections 506(c) and 552. Code 
section 506(c) allows the estate to recover the reasonable and necessary 
costs of liquidating the secured creditors’ collateral to the extent the 
secured creditor is benefited.7 Code section 552 allows a bankruptcy 
judge to cut off a security interest in proceeds to the extent that is an 
equitable outcome.8 As set forth below, these sections oftentimes are not 
used appropriately when the estate waives its right to the benefit of these 
sections within the first month of a case. I argue herein that courts should 
not approve those waivers so that the remedies under those sections can 
be applied in appropriate cases to impose the costs of administration on a 
secured creditor that is using Chapter 11 to liquidate its collateral. 
Part I of the article explains the choices that a secured creditor 
                                                          
6 E.g., In re LCI Holding Co., 802 F.3d 547 (3d Cir. 2015) (before the Chapter 
11 case, secured creditor negotiated a deal to pay some professionals and to pay 
wind-down costs associated with selling its collateral in Chapter 11, but refused 
to pay other expenses of case administration even though the estate was 
insolvent: Third Circuit approved “gifting” structure that left administrative tax 
claims unpaid); see generally In re Petersburg Regency, LLC, 540 B.R. 503 
(Bankr. D.N.J. 2015) (carve out for all administrative creditors topped at 
$150,000; initially settlement contemplated not paying IRS priority and 
administrative claim; settlement revised to pay IRS claims). 
7 11 U.S.C. § 506(c) (1978). 
8 11 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1978). 
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faces with respect to the disposition of its collateral when it has a blanket 
lien on the assets of a debtor. Part II illustrates the problem of secured 
creditors using Chapter 11 to liquidate their collateral and not paying all 
the expenses of case administration. Part III describes the roles of 
sections 506(c) and 552(b), and describes how secured creditors 
routinely obtain a waiver of a Code section 506(c) surcharge and the 
application of the equitable exception to its continuing security interest in 
proceeds provided for in section 552(b) at the outset of a Chapter 11 
case. Part IV explains that these releases are entered into without 
compliance with the normal requirements for debtors’ releasing claims. 
Part IV also establishes that if the normal requirements were followed, 
the court usually could not approve the 506(c) and 552(b) waivers. 
Finally, Part V proposes a bright line test for determining when secured 
creditors should be liable for administrative expenses: if the secured 
creditor’s collateral is liquidated in a Chapter 11 case as a going concern, 
the secured creditor should be liable for administrative expenses of the 
case if its assets are not otherwise available to pay those expenses. This 
rule balances the interest of the estate and the secured lender by allowing 
a secured lender to determine for itself whether it believes the costs of 
administration are beneficial to it. It preserves for the secured creditor the 
benefit of its bargain—to be able to use foreclosure under Article 9 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code—while simultaneously protecting 
administrative creditors from being used by the secured creditor without 
being compensated. 
II. THE SECURED CREDITOR’S CHOICE  
The cases in which Chapter 11 administrative creditors are short-
changed are typically cases that are converted to Chapter 7 after 
substantially all the assets of the estate have been sold, or that culminate 
in “structured dismissals”—cases in which the assets of the debtor are 
sold and the case is dismissed with court orders previously entered 
remaining in effect. These cases are increasingly common,9 and 
                                                          
9 Norman L. Pernick & G. David Dean, Structured Chapter 11 Dismissals: A 
Viable and Growing Alternative After Asset Sales, AM. BANKR. INST. J. 1, (June 
2010); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. CIT Grp./Res. Credit Inc. (In 
re Jevic Holding Corp.), 787 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2015) (The Supreme Court has 
granted certiorari in the Jevic case, but the question presented is not whether all 
structured dismissals are inappropriate; rather, the question is whether a 
structured dismissal in which the estate’s assets are distributed in a manner 
contrary to Code section 507 is appropriate. Accordingly, putting aside the 
4
Journal of Business & Securities Law, Vol. 17 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/jbsl/vol17/iss1/4
  
 
 
Issue 1  Paying-To-Play in Chapter 11 117 
oftentimes involve under-secured creditors. When a creditor is under-
secured, the creditor has four options for realizing on its collateral: (1) a 
traditional Chapter 11case in which it funds administrative and priority 
claims in full in order to allow the debtor to confirm a reorganization 
plan; (2) a Chapter 7 case, in which it can either (a) push the Chapter 7 
trustee to abandon the collateral as soon as possible, or failing that, move 
to lift the automatic stay10 so that it can proceed with its state law 
remedies, or (b) cooperate with the Chapter 7 trustee to sell the collateral 
out of Chapter 7; (3) recover the collateral in accordance with the options 
available under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code; or (4) 
cooperate in a Chapter 11 case that concludes with a structured dismissal 
in which the collateral is sold—often as a going concern sale—and the 
case subsequently dismissed with all orders staying in place.11 In the last 
option, the secured creditor would typically be cooperating because, in a 
case in which a plan cannot be confirmed, the secured creditor would 
have a good cause to lift the automatic stay to proceed with a state law 
foreclosure on its collateral.12 
These are not great choices, but being under-secured with a lien 
on an operating business is not a great position to be in either. 
A traditional Chapter 11 case is expensive: in order to confirm a 
plan, administrative claims must be paid,13 priority claims must be paid,14 
a plan and disclosure statement must be drafted and approved.15 
Critically, the plan cannot be confirmed unless an impaired class accepts 
the plan16 (because unsecured creditors will not be paid in full on the 
                                                                                                                                  
potential for extremely expansive dicta from the Supreme Court that is then 
followed by the lower courts, the issues relating to structured dismissals will 
continue to be important notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Jevic.) 
10 The “automatic stay” of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) prohibits many creditor actions to 
recover on their prepetition claims. A creditor can move to lift the stay for cause. 
11 U.S.C. § 362(d).  
11 11 U.S.C. § 1112 provides for the dismissal of a Chapter 11 case; 11 U.S.C. § 
349(b) has been interpreted to allow pre-dismissal orders entered in a Chapter 11 
case to remain in effect. 
12 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d). 
13 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(A) (providing that, absent consent of the creditor, 
administrative claims must be paid in full in order to confirm a reorganization 
plan). 
1411 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(B)-(C). 
15 11 U.S.C. §§ 1125-1129. In limited cases, the plan can serve as a disclosure 
statement. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(f). 
16 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (10). 
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plan’s effective date, the plan will have at least one impaired class).17 
Confirming a plan is an option that only makes sense if the secured 
creditor is convinced that the going concern value of a sale under 
Chapter 11 is so much greater than the costs of confirming a plan that it 
makes sense to proceed in this manner. This option might make sense 
when the business needs a great deal of cleanup in Chapter 11 and 
administrative and priority claims are not disproportionately high 
compared to the perceived advantages of a cleanup. This may be the only 
option if the business needs substantial restructuring that is only 
available in Chapter 11, and the court is disinclined to enter a novel 
structured dismissal order that is broad enough to address the secured 
creditor’s concerns relating to its collateral. In this option, by definition 
the secured creditor must pay-to-play, because a case cannot be 
confirmed without paying all administrative and priority claims.18 
Another choice, liquidating collateral in a Chapter 7 case, 
oftentimes is a horrible option. Chapter 7 trustees will sell collateral for 
the benefit of a secured creditor, but they understandably want to be paid 
for that work and show some benefit to other creditors. While Chapter 7 
trustees can sell debtors’ businesses as going concerns—the Refco cases 
and the Lehman Brothers cases illustrate that—such sales are rare.19 Both 
the Refco sales and the Lehman Brothers sales took place in unusual 
cases that were highly choreographed, and such Chapter 7 cases are not a 
usual option. Although Chapter 7 trustees can theoretically operate a 
business post-filing,20 that is not their key expertise. Rather, they often 
are more adept a suing secured creditors. In short, a Chapter 7 disposition 
is seldom an attractive option. 
A third choice may be state law remedies, but again, that can be 
                                                          
17 See 11 U.S.C. § 1124 (explaining the term “impaired”). 
18 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9). 
19 In re Refco, LLC, 05-60134 (RDD) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005), Order 
Authorizing Chapter 7 Trustee to Assume and Perform Acquisition Agreement, 
Sell the Regulated Futures Commission Merchant Business and Assume and 
Assign Certain Related Executory Contracts, Nov. 25, 2005, ECF 10; In re 
Refco, LLC, 05-60134 (RDD) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005), Order Authorizing 
Chapter 7 Trustee to Operate Business of Refco, LLC for a Limited Period and 
Granting Related Relief, Nov. 25, 2005, ECF. 9; In re Lehman Brothers 
Holdings, Inc., 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008), Order Under 11 U.S.C. 
§§ 105(a), 363, and 365 and Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 2002, 6004, 
and 6006 Authorizing and Approving (A) the Sale of Purchased Assets Free and 
Clear of Liens and Other Interests and (B) Assumption and Assignment of 
Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases, Sept. 20, 2008, ECF  258. 
20 11 U.S.C. § 721(allowing chapter 7 trustee to operate business). 
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Issue 1  Paying-To-Play in Chapter 11 119 
an unattractive choice. Unless the blanket lien is structured so that the 
diverse assets are held in a legally separate entity (a “Holdco”), in which 
case the foreclosure/strict foreclosure process can be accomplished with 
a stock transfer for the most part, the assets might go through a 
potentially messy foreclosure in which the creditor might lose value and, 
temporary, control. More importantly, the state law option also forgoes 
any of the benefits of a bankruptcy case, such as the ability to reject 
executory contracts21 and leave obligations behind.22 Closely related to 
these state law remedies are the two options of (1) negotiating relief from 
the automatic stay or abandonment of the collateral with the estate 
representative (be it a Chapter 11 trustee, a Chapter 7 trustee, or a debtor 
in possession); or moving to lift the automatic stay to foreclose on the 
collateral in state court. All the detriments described earlier in this 
section are concerns, because a creditor faces the possibility of battles in 
multiple venues: at the least in a lift stay motion, a creditor could face a 
Chapter 7 litigation to be followed by a state law quagmire. 
That leaves the option of participating in a Chapter 11 case in 
which the company is sold as a going concern, and the case is dismissed 
without a plan having been confirmed. For many under-secured creditors 
this is an attractive option if the court is willing to allow this use of the 
Bankruptcy Code.23 Secured creditors can take advantage of a free and 
clear order from the bankruptcy court,24 they can leave behind unwanted 
claims, they can reject the contracts or leases the business does not want 
and leave the associated claims behind. Some courts even allow more 
aggressive use of a structured dismissal, such as the incorporation of 
exculpation provisions or releases in the dismissal order that avoid post-
case litigation. This alone could be enough of a difference from a state 
                                                          
21 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (allowing trustee to assume or reject any executor 
contract). 
22 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (allowing for the sale of estate assets “free and clear of any 
interest in such property of any entity other than the estate” if certain criteria are 
met). 
23 The structured dismissal option has been approved by the Third Circuit in a 
recent case for which certiorari has been granted. Official Comm. of Unsecured 
Creditors v. CIT Grp./Bus. Credit, Inc. In re Jevic Holdings Co., 787 F.3d 173 
(3d Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 2541 (2016). The question presented to 
the Supreme Court is not whether a structured dismissal is allowed, but rather 
whether a dismissal that pays creditors in a manner contrary to the requirements 
of Code section 507 is allowable. 
24 A “free and clear order” is entered under section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy 
Code. 
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law liquidation to make a Chapter 11 dismissal case attractive.25 
So what are secured creditors choosing? We have no definitive 
answers statistically, but the case law reflects that creditors increasingly 
are choosing the structured dismissal.26 In those cases, and in cases in 
which a going concern sale occurs, and the case is later converted to a 
Chapter 7 case, the secured creditor should, at a minimum, be liable for 
all the costs of administration if other assets are not available to pay 
those claims.27 
III. THE PROBLEM ILLUSTRATED 
The problem of secured creditors not wanting to pay-to-play is 
illustrated by a recent case from the Third Circuit, LCI Holding Co.,28 
that may prove to be a roadmap for secured creditors to stiff 
administrative creditors in the same manner that the LCI secured creditor 
managed to stiff an administrative creditor in that case. In LCI, the 
secured creditor, which had a so-called blanket lien on the debtors’ 
assets,29 negotiated the use of Chapter 11 prepetition in order to liquidate 
its collateral. The outcome of that negotiation was that the secured 
creditor would pay certain professional expenses, pay agreed-upon wind 
down expenses, and credit bid a portion of its claim to acquire the 
                                                          
25 See Pernick & Dean, supra, note 9. 
26 In re Petersberg Regency, LLC, 540 B.R. 503 (Bankr. D. N.J. 2015) 
(approving structured dismissal); In re Naartjie Custom Kids, Inc., 534 B.R. 416 
(Bankr. D. Utah 2015) (approving structured dismissal); In re Buffet Partners, 
L.P., Case No. 14-30699-HDH-11 (July 28, 2014), 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 3204 
(N.D. Texas 2014) (approving structured dismissal); In re Biolitec, 528 B.R. 
261, 272 (Bankr. N.J. 2014) (debtor requested structured dismissal, which court 
would not approve); In re Strategic Labor, Inc., 476 B.R. 11 (Bankr. D. Mass. 
2012) (converting case to Chapter 7 and refusing to enter structured dismissal 
order in light of the debtor’s wrongdoing). A number of unreported cases are 
also structured dismissals. E.g., In re LCI Holdings, Corp., Case No. 12-13319 
(KG) (Bankr. D. Del.), Order Granting Debtors’ Motion for Entry of Order 
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 105(a), 305(a), 349 and 112(b) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 
1017(a) (A) Dismissing the Debtors’ Chapter 11 Cases and (B) Granting Related 
Relief, Jan. 24, 2014, ECF No. 1137. 
27 In appropriate cases, the secured creditor should also be liable for all priority 
claims of employees, because it is the employees that have enhanced the going 
concern value of the company. In many cases, the secured creditor will agree to 
an order to be entered at the beginning of the case that will pay outstanding 
wages and some, if not all, outstanding benefits. 
28 See 802 F.3d 547 (3d Cir. 2015). 
29 The debtors consisted of thirty-five related companies. Id. at 550. 
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Issue 1  Paying-To-Play in Chapter 11 121 
debtors’ assets,30 after which the Chapter 11 case would be dismissed. 
The motion to approve a sale would be sought at the inception of the 
case.31 From the very outset of the case, the deal was that the secured 
creditor would have no liability for the costs of liquidating its collateral 
that it did not choose to assume; the financing order entered shortly after 
the case was filed provided both that the estate could not recover from 
the prepetition lenders under Code section 506(c) and that the “equities 
of the case” exception to their continuing security interest in proceeds 
could not be applied to them.32 
Although the secured creditor had agreed to pay some wind 
down expenses, the secured creditor did not agree to pay a large 
administrative tax claim, and it continued to refuse to pay this 
administrative claim even after an administrative creditor objected.33 
Eventually, the secured creditor recut the deal to make a small payment 
to unsecured creditors,34 but it still refused to pay a large outstanding 
administrative tax claim. Based on the so-called gifting theory, the Third 
Circuit affirmed the order providing for the disposition of assets on these 
terms.35 
Because the Third Circuit hears appeals from the District of 
Delaware, and because Delaware has a disproportionate number of large 
Chapter 11 cases, this decision could have a great impact on liquidations 
going forward.  
The loss of value to creditors that are not secured creditors has 
troubled Chapter 11 scholars. Scholars fear that when a case conducts a 
sale of substantially all of the assets of the estate early in the case, the 
property will be sold for less than fair market value, and under-secured 
creditors will still be shortchanged. In their well-known article, Ice Cube 
Bonds: Allocating the Price of Process in Chapter 11,36 Melissa B. 
Jacoby and Edward J. Janger suggest that one way to address the 
problem is to provide for a holdback in the form of a bond available for 
                                                          
30 Id.  
31 Id. at 550-51. 
32 In re LCI Holding, Co., 12-13319-KC (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 23, 2013), Final 
Order Under 11 U.S.C. §§ 105, 361, 362, 363(c), 363(m), 364(c)(1), 364(c)2), 
364(c)(3), 364(d)(1), 364(e) and 507 and Bankruptcy Rules 2002, 4001, and 
9014 Authorizing the Debtors to Obtain Postpetition Financing, (II) Authorizing 
the Debtors to Use Cash Collateral, and (III) Granting Adequate Protection to 
Prepetition Secured Lenders, ¶¶ 12, 13, Jan. 23, 2013, ECF No. 0291. 
33 Id. at 551. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 557-58 & n. 6. 
36 133 YALE L. REV. 862, 873 (2013) 
9
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distribution to creditors if the estate assets (justified on the theory that the 
estate was a melting ice cube) were undervalued in a quick sale. In a 
follow-up article, The Logic and Limit of Liens,37 Professor Janger 
suggests that protection for unsecured creditors can be found in Code 
section 552, but he does not address the problem that arises from the 
protections of Code section 552 (to be described below) being routinely 
waived at the inception of a case, and thus naturally he posits no 
suggestion for addressing the problem of the 552 “equities of the case” 
right having been waived routinely before the case is underway. 
IV. CODE SECTIONS 506(C) AND 552 
 
A. Code Section 506(c)  
 
Section 506(c) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that the 
collateral of a secured creditor can be surcharged. In other words, certain 
expenses incurred by the estate can be paid out of the proceeds of the 
disposition of the collateral. That section provides: 
 
The trustee may recover from property securing an 
allowed secured claim the reasonable, necessary costs 
and expenses of preserving, or disposing of, such 
property to the extent of any benefit to the holder of such 
claim, including the payment of all ad valorem property 
taxes with respect to the property.38 
 
The statute therefore has three requirements for imposing a 
surcharge for preserving or disposing of the secured creditors’ property: 
the expense must be (1) necessary; (2) reasonable; and (3) limited to the 
extent to the benefit to the holder of the secured claim. 
Notwithstanding the plain language of the Code and the Supreme 
Court’s repeated emphasis on respecting the plain language of codified 
laws, courts have imposed additional requirements to impose a 
surcharge: most notably, many courts hold that the expenditure must 
have been, at the time it was made, primarily for the benefit of the holder 
of the claim unless the secured creditor caused or consented to the 
expenditures.39 This language represents judicial requirements that go 
                                                          
37 2015 ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 589, 600, available at https://perma.cc/AF37-6S6B. 
38 11 U.S.C. § 506(c) (1978). 
39 E.g., In re Cascade Hydraulics & Utility Service, Inc., 815 F. 2d 546, 548 (9th 
10
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beyond the statutory language: the legislative history explains that “[a]ny 
time the trustee . . . expends money to provide for the reasonable and 
necessary cost and expenses of preserving or disposing of a secured 
creditor’s collateral, the trustee . . . is entitled to recover such expenses 
from the secured party or from property” of the estate.40 
These cases reflect a reluctance of the courts to impose a 
surcharge on secured creditors. Notably, however, the circuit level case 
law regarding 506(c) is clustered in the early 1980’s and seldom involve 
cases in which the creditor has a so-called “blanket lien,” covering much 
of the collateral.41 
While a number of cases have held that the surcharge has to be 
primarily for the benefit of the secured creditor, recent case law takes a 
more practical approach. In Southwest Sec. FSB v. Segner (In re 
Domistyle, Inc.),42 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that expenses 
incurred by a trustee prior to moving to abandon estate property could be 
charged against the secured creditor. In so doing, it emphasized that a 
judicially-crafted rule that only allowed the surcharge of expenses in the 
period between the time a trustee had filed a motion to abandon the 
property and the time the secured creditor did not oppose abandonment 
was an artificial test that was inconsistent with the statutory language.43 
Although the courts are not uniform on when § 506(c) should be 
                                                                                                                                  
Cir. 1987); In re Trim-X, Inc., 695 F.2d 296, 301 (7th Cir. 1982). 
40 124 Cong. Rec. H32,398 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (represented in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6436, 6451). 
41 United Jersey Bank v. Miller (In re C.S. Assocs.), 29 F.3d 903, 906 (3d Cir. 
1994) (expenses must provide “direct benefit” to the secured creditor); United 
States v. Boatman’s First Nat’l Bank, 5 F.3d 1157 (8th Cir. 1993) (workers’ 
compensation insurance and payroll taxes are subject to 506(c) surcharge; as a 
going concern, creditor likely received a greater recovery); Credit Bank of 
Montana v. Cascade Hydraulics and Utility Service, Inc. (In re Cascade 
Hydraulics & Utility Service, Inc.), 815 F. 2d 546 (9th Cir. 1987)(secured 
creditor cannot be surcharged when company failed to confirm reorganization 
plan and had to revise the plan to liquidate); General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Levin 
& Weintraub (In re Flagstaff Foodservice Corp., 739 F.2d 73, 76 (2d Cir. 1984); 
Brookfield Production Credit Association v. Borron, 738 F.2d 951, 952 (8th Cir. 
1984); In re Trim-X, Inc., 695 F.2d 296, 301 (7th Cir. 1982)(expenses of 
preserving assets from the date trustee was appointed until the date that the 
trustee could have abandoned the property were necessary expenses but the only 
expenses that “benefitted the secured creditor were those that arose after the 
motion to abandon the assets). 
42 811 F.3d 691, 696-700 (5th Cir. 2015). 
43 Id. at 699. 
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allowed to surcharge a secured creditor, one aspect of the § 506(c) puzzle 
is clear. It is the estate (be it a trustee or a debtor in possession) that has 
the right to seek a surcharge. The Code specifically states that “a trustee 
can recover” the surcharge,44 and the Supreme Court held in 2000 that 
the plain words of the statute controlled. In Hartford Underwriters Ins. 
Co. v. Union Planters Bank,45 the court held that a creditor itself could 
not bring an action to recover expenses under Code section 506(c). The 
Court did leave open one window, however; it left for another day the 
issue of whether a creditors’ committee or another entity acting on behalf 
of the estate could bring a derivative action to surcharge collateral.46 That 
opening is important because in many cases it is the creditors committee 
(or a litigation trustee established under a Chapter 11 plan) that brings 
actions to enforce causes of actions of the estate. 
Notwithstanding the Code’s providing for a surcharge of the 
secured creditor in appropriate cases, a surcharge is rarely imposed in 
Chapter 11 cases. That is because a waiver of the right to recover a 
surcharge under section 506(c) is the norm in large Chapter 11 cases. It is 
very common in Chapter 11 cases under the local rules of the District of 
Delaware, in which many of these large cases are filed, which has a 
special provision about the 506(c) waiver.47 
The waiver is typically set forth in an order allowing the debtor 
to use the creditor’s cash collateral or in an order providing for the debtor 
to obtain financing. It is typically entered within the first month of a 
Chapter 11 case before many constituents know the direction the case is 
likely to take.48 Even though courts routinely approve this waiver, a few 
courts are reluctant.49 
                                                          
44 § 506(c). Elsewhere, the Code provides that a debtor-in-possession—the term 
for a debtor in a Chapter 11 case when a Chapter 11 trustee has not been 
appointed—has all the powers and duties of a trustee, with limited exceptions 
not relevant here. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a). 
45 530 U.S. 1, 9 (2000). 
46 Id. at 13, n.5. 
47 Del. Bankr. Ct. Loc. R. 4001-2(a)(i)(C) (Feb. 1, 2016) (necessity of 
highlighting § 506(c) waiver in financing or cash collateral pleadings). 
48 Marcia L. Goldstein & Victoria Vron, Current Issues in Debtor in Possession 
Financing, SK092 ALI-ABA 115 (June 2005). 
49 McAlpine v. Comerica Bank-Detroit (In re Brown Brothers, Inc.), 136 B.R. 
470, 474 (W.D. Mich. 1991); In re The Colad Group, Inc., 324 B.R. 208, 224 
(Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2005) (refusing to approve 506(c) waiver provision in debtor-
in-possession financing); In re Ridgeline Structures, Inc., 154 B.R. 831, 832 
(Bankr. D. N.H. 1993) (stipulation waiving surcharge “no matter what action, 
inaction, or acquiescence by [the secured party] might occur” and which failed 
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Here is a 506(c) waiver from the General Motors’ Chapter 11 
case: 
 
[E]xcept to the extent of the Carve Out, no expenses of 
administration of the cases or any future proceeding that 
may result therefrom . . . shall be charged against or 
recovered from the Collateral pursuant to section 506(c) 
of the Bankruptcy Code or any similar principle of law50 
 
Courts enter orders providing for the waiver because the orders 
in which the § 506(c) waiver appears are so critically important to a 
Chapter 11 case. Whether a debtor is liquidating or attempting to 
reorganize, the debtor needs cash. These days, because creditors often 
have a blanket lien on all the debtors’ assets,51 the debtor entering 
Chapter 11 likely has no free cash. Cash that might appear to be 
unencumbered in fact could be the proceeds of collateral or subject to the 
security interest of the bank in which an account is located.52 Therefore, 
to enable a debtor to operate it business, the debtor needs either to obtain 
a post-petition debtor-in-possession financing facility or needs to obtain 
permission to use cash collateral, because the Bankruptcy Code forbids 
the debtor in possession from using cash collateral without court 
authorization.53 
                                                                                                                                  
to be on proper notice was unenforceable per se as being against public policy). 
50 In re General Motors, 09-500026 (REG), Interim Order Under 11 U.S.C. §§ 
105, 361, 363, 363 and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2002, 4001 and 9014 (I) Authorizing 
Debtors to Use Cash Collateral, (II) Granting Adequate Protection to Pre-
petition Revolver Secured Parties and (III) Scheduling a Final Hearing Pursuant 
to Bankruptcy Rule 4001(b), June 1, 2009, ECF 180. 
51 Janger, supra note 37, at 596 (“loan documents are often structured to 
manifest an intention to encumber all assets in favor of a secured lender. . .This 
package of conveyances is then described as a “blanket lien”). Professor Janger 
argues in this article that Code section 552(b) should be broadly construed in 
appropriate circumstances. I agree with that conclusion, but believe that the first 
step to giving weight to section 552(b) is to prohibit its waiver at the outset of a 
case. 
52 Id. at 595-96 (describing how lenders contend that all the debtor’s assets are 
subject to their liens or are the proceeds of their liens). 
53 11 U.S.C § 363(c)(2) provides that “the trustee . . .may not use . . .cash 
collateral unless:  
(A) each entity that has an interest in such cash collateral consents; or  
13
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Accordingly, in all but the most abnormal cases, the debtor will 
negotiate a debtor-in -possession financing (“DIP financing” in the lingo 
of the trade), or a cash collateral agreement with lenders.54 The cash 
collateral order is by definition negotiated with the prepetition lenders; 
the DIP financing order is oftentimes negotiated with the debtors’ 
prepetition lenders. In virtually all cases, the financing or cash collateral 
facility will provide for two things: a “carve out” for professionals and a 
§ 506(c) waiver.55 
The carve out is designed to guarantee professionals who work 
for the debtor that they will be paid if the debtor is administratively 
insolvent. That is especially important these days when all the debtors’ 
assets may be encumbered. The carve out typically provides that the 
debtors’ professionals (and oftentimes the creditors’ committees’ 
professionals) will be paid out of the secured creditors collateral even if 
the estate is administratively insolvent. In effect, the carve out is a 
negotiated provision for a surcharge that will kick in without litigation in 
the worst case scenario.56 
The financing or cash collateral agreements providing for a § 
506(c) waiver are typically filed with the court on the first day of the 
case. Indeed, they are so common that the patois of the trade has named 
them “First Day Orders.” They are entered – again, oftentimes on the 
first day of a case—on an interim basis (although in many cases the § 
506(c) waiver may not be effective until a final order is entered with 
greater notice). The bankruptcy rules specifically require that this type of 
financing order or cash collateral order in final form only be entered after 
                                                                                                                                  
(B) the court, after notice and a hearing, authorizes such use. . . in 
accordance with the provisions of this section. 
54 Cash collateral includes “cash, negotiable instruments, documents of title, 
securities, deposit accounts, or other cash equivalents . . . and includes the 
proceeds, products, offspring, rents or profits of property.”  11 U.S.C. § 363(a).  
A debtor may not use cash collateral without the consent of all creditors with 
security interests in the cash collateral without court authorization.  11 U.S.C. § 
363(c)(2).  The court must find that the secured creditor is adequately protected 
in order to authorize use of the cash collateral without the secured creditors’ 
consent.  11 U.S.C. § 361. 
55 David A. Skeel, Jr., The Past, Present and Future of Debtor-in-Possession 
Financing, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1905, 1929 (2004); George W. Kuney, 
Hijacking Chapter 11, 21 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 19, 67 (2004). 
56 For an overview of the case law on carve outs, see Richard B. Levin, Almost 
All You Ever Wanted to Know About Carve Out, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 445 
(2002). 
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creditors have received fourteen days’ notice of the requested relief.57 
Why are these waivers included in the First Day Orders? The 
waivers are included because secured creditors are smart enough to ask 
for them. The debtor is desperate for cash and often has little leverage in 
the negotiations. Because the cause of action belongs to the debtor, one 
circuit court has even held that creditors cannot object to the § 506(c) 
waiver.58 In any event, in the first month of a case, creditors may not 
even realize how important a 506(c) waiver may ultimately prove to be. 
Once the waiver is provided for in an order, courts routinely 
enforce the waiver on the basis that the order is res judicata.59 
B. Code Section 552(b) 
There is another potentially beneficial provision of the 
Bankruptcy Code that is typically waived in the first month of a 
bankruptcy case: a provision in Code section 552. That section provides: 
 
(b)(1) Except as provided in sections . . . 506(c) . . . of 
this title, if the debtor and an entity entered into a 
security agreement before the commencement of the 
case and if the security interest created by such security 
agreement extends to property of the debtor acquired 
before the commencement of the case and to proceeds, 
products, offspring, or profits of such property, then 
such security interest extends to such proceeds, products, 
offspring, or profits acquired by the estate after the 
commencement of the case to the extent provided by 
                                                          
57 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4001 (a)(3). 
58 In re Debbie Reynolds Hotel & Casino, Inc., 255 F.3d 1061, 1065-68 (9th Cir. 
2001). This result does not really make sense because many avoidance actions 
(such as preference actions and fraudulent conveyance actions) are assigned to 
the trustee to bring. If a creditor could not object to the settlement of a cause of 
action that, by the terms of the Bankruptcy Code, the trustee is assigned to 
prosecute, then the trustee or debtor-in- possession would have carte blanche to 
settle avoidance actions. 
59 In re InteliQuest Media Corp., 326 B.R. 825, 830-31 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2005) 
(affirming order denying motion to compel trustee to bring an action under Code 
section 506(c) because debtors had entered into 506(c) waiver in financing 
orders); In re Molten Metal Tech., 244 B.R. 515, 519 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2000) 
(section 506(c) waiver previously approved by the court enforceable as being res 
judicata); In re Film Equipment Rental Co., No. 91 CIV.3476 (CSH), 1991 WL 
274464, at *1, *3 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (enforcing section 506(c) waiver). 
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such security agreement and by applicable 
nonbankruptcy law, except to the extent that the court, 
after notice and a hearing and based on the equities of 
the case, orders otherwise.60 
 
This section of the Bankruptcy Code must be read with the 
Uniform Commercial Code in mind, because the U.C.C. specifically 
provides that a security interest in collateral automatically extends to 
proceeds.61 Therefore, by definition, all prepetition security interests 
should extend to proceeds unless the secured creditor and the debtor 
negotiated a different deal. The definition of proceeds is broad; indeed, it 
was amended in 2001 to include property that had not previously been 
within the scope of the definition.62 
In any event, like the typical provision waiving § 506(c) 
surcharges, this “equities of the case” exception to the continuing interest 
in proceeds is often waived at the outset of a case in a cash collateral 
order or a financing order. For example, in the LCI Holding case, 
described above, the final financing and cash collateral order provided: 
“the equities of the case” exception under § 552(b) of the Bankruptcy 
Code shall not apply to the Prepetition Agent and the Prepetition 
Lenders.63 
How common is the Code section 552 waiver? There is no 
empirical study of this, to the best of my knowledge, but it is so common 
that the venue of most large Chapter 11 cases, Delaware, has a local rule 
                                                          
60 § 552(b)(1). 
61 U.C.C. § 9-203(f) (Am. Law Inst. & Unif. Law Comm’n 2014) (“The 
attachment of a security interest in a collateral gives the secured party the rights 
to proceeds provided by Section 9-315 . . . .”). 
62 U.C.C. § 9-315 (defining proceeds). See G. Ray Warner, Article 9’s Bankrupt 
Proceeds Rule: Amending Bankruptcy Code Section 552 Through the UCC 
“Proceeds” Definition, 46 GONZAGA LAW. REV. 521 (2010-2011) (discussing 
Article 9’s expansion of the definition of proceeds); G. Ray Warner, The Anti-
Bankruptcy Act: Revised Article 9 and Bankruptcy, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 
3 (2001). See In re Bumper Sales, Inc., 907 F.2d 1430, 1437 (4th Cir. 1990) 
(noting that the term proceeds is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code and thus 
term should be defined in accordance with state law). 
63 In re LCI Holding, Co., No.12-13319-KG, slip op. 2013 WL 1101111, at *1 
(Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 15, 2013) (Under “11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a), 363, 507(a), 
1107(a), and 1108 and Fed. R.  Bankr. P. 6003, Authorizing [the] Debtors” to 
Obtain Postpetition Financing, (II) Authorizing the Debtors to Use Cash 
Collateral, and (III) Granting Adequate Protection to Prepetition Secured 
Lenders). 
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requiring that the provision be highlighted in any financing or cash 
collateral order, just as it requires the section 506(c) waiver to be 
highlighted.64 
Perhaps because so many cash collateral and financing orders 
provide for a section § 552 waiver, there is not a great body of case law 
delineating situations in which “the equities of the case” are such that it 
is appropriate to limit a secured creditor’s security interest in proceeds. 
Courts have explained that “the ‘equities of the case’ provision is 
intended to prevent secured creditors from receiving windfalls and to 
allow the bankruptcy courts broad discretion in balancing the interests of 
secured creditors against the general policy of the Bankruptcy Code.”65 
One of the relatively few cases, however, construing the “equities of the 
case” proceeds exception is In re Photo Promotion Associates.66 There, 
the court relied on the equities of the case exception to section 552(b)(1) 
to limit the secured creditor’s interests in proceeds of its prepetition 
security interest in the debtors’ contracts because those proceeds had 
arisen through the expenditure of unencumbered property to complete 
the work to be done on the contracts. 
Despite the comparative paucity of case law construing section 
552(b)(1), in theory, the section could be a powerful tool to compensate 
the estate for the expenses it incurs in allowing a secured creditor to use 
Chapter 11 to enhance its recovery on its security interest. The phrase 
“equities of the case” is undefined, but it would seem to allow the estate 
to benefit from the recovery on proceeds of the secured creditor’s 
collateral if the estate would otherwise be unable to pay its 
administrative expenses. 
The benefit of having both Code sections available for the 
recovery of administrative expenses from a secured creditor in an 
administratively insolvent case is that there is a well-developed body of 
case law construing Code section 506(c) that could be a barrier to a 
recovery in certain circuits. Thus, a circuit (such as the Seventh Circuit) 
that requires that an expenditure be primarily for the benefit of the 
secured creditor may not allow a charge against the collateral in a 
particular case. By contrast, an action to release proceeds under Code 
section 552(b) may have more possibility of success, given the standard 
that the proponent only has to show that the recovery is based on the 
equities of the case. 
                                                          
64 Del. Bankr. Ct. Loc. R. 4001-2(a)(i)(H) (requiring highlighting of “provisions 
that seek to affect the court’s power to consider the equities of the case”). 
65 In re Patio & Porch Sys., 194 B.R. 569, 575 (Bankr. D. Md. 1996). 
66 61 B.R. 936, 939 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
17
Henry: Paying-To-Play in Chapter 11
Published by Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law, 2017
 
 
130 Journal of Business & Securities Law Vol. 17 
V. SECTION 506(C) AND 552(b) WAIVERS GENERALLY SHOULD 
NOT BE APPROVED AT THE OUTSET OF A CHAPTER 11 CASE 
Properly analyzed, the waivers of rights under 506(c) and 552 at 
the outset of the case are releases or settlements. The debtor is settling its 
claims against the secured creditor for the consideration of the cash 
collateral order or the financing order. Understand, though, that no 
section of the Bankruptcy Code specifically addresses the waiver of these 
rights in exchange for financing or the use of cash. Because these 
waivers are just releases or settlements, the propriety of the waivers, 
then, depends on the rules allowing debtors to release or settle claims. 
Although debtors are allowed to release claims in a Chapter 11 
plan under 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(3), no section of the Code specifically 
allows debtors to release claims outside of a reorganization plan. 
However, Bankruptcy Rule 9019 allows a debtor to settle claims.67 In 
determining whether to approve a release, many courts consider (1) the 
probability of success in the litigation; (2) the difficulties in collecting a 
judgment; (3) the complexity of the litigation; (4) the expense, 
inconvenience and delay caused by the litigation; and (5) the paramount 
interest of creditors and deference to their reasonable views.68 Some 
courts have even more demanding criteria for approving the debtor’s 
release of claims.69 
Applying these criteria, the estate faces a high bar to waive 
506(c) and 552(b) rights, a bar that an estate could rarely meet at the 
outset of a case. 
                                                          
67 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9019 provides that “[o]n motion by the trustee and after 
notice and a hearing, the court may approve a compromise or settlement.” 
68 Protective Comm. for Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. 
Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 424 (1968); In re LCI Holding Co., 802 F.3d 547, 551-
52 (3d Cir. 2015); In re Martin, 91 F.3d 389, 393 (3d Cir. 1996); In re Tower 
Auto., Inc., 241 F.R.D. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); In re Remsen Partners, 294 B.R. 
557, 565 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
69 In re Exide Techs., 303 B.R. 48, 71-74 (Bankr. D. Del. 2013) (articulating 
different standards for the debtors’ release of claims than for the release of 
claims by a creditor against a third-party); In re Zenith Elecs. Corp., 241 B.R. 
92, 110 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999) (adopting Master Mortgage test for approving the 
debtor’s release of claims); In re Master Mortgage Inv. Fund, Inc., 168 B.R. 
930, 937 (Bankr. W. D. Mo. 1994) (setting forth multi-part test that must be met 
to allow debtor to release claims). See generally, In re Cont’l Airlines, 203 F.3d 
203, 214 (3d Cir. 2000) (declining to articulate standard for the debtor’s release 
of estate claims against third parties). 
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A. Probability of Success in the Litigation 
The estate cannot know the probability of success in sections 
506(c) or 552(b) litigation at the outset of most cases. The expenses that 
the estate will incur are prospective; who can predict whether these yet-
to-be-incurred expenses will be reasonable or necessary? Similarly, who 
can predict the amount to which the secured creditor will benefit from 
the expenses to be incurred? Admittedly, in some cases—those cases in 
which the DIP financing or cash collateral order provides for a brief 
timetable to sell estate assets and therefore the case seems to have as its 
primary goal the liquidation of the secured creditors’ assets—the debtor 
may have a high probability of success in Code section 506(c) litigation, 
especially if it appears from the inception of the case that the creditor is 
undersecured. Similarly, because the critical question with respect to a 
Code section 552(b) determination is the “equities of the case,” it would 
normally be impossible to assess the equitable considerations during the 
first month of the case. Accordingly, this factor—probability of success 
in the litigation—will not support a court’s approval of a § 506(c) or § 
552(b) waiver in a DIP financing or cash collateral order entered early in 
a case. 
B. Complexity of the Litigation 
An action to recover costs under Code section § 506(c) is not a 
particularly complex litigation factually. Similarly, an action to avoid the 
secured creditor’s interest in proceeds based on the equities of the case 
should not usually be particularly complex litigation. The key factual 
issue in a section 506(c) action is what costs the estate incurred (and the 
estate needs to keep track of its expenditures as part of its duties as 
debtor in possession in any case70). Whether the secured creditor will 
benefit from the expenditures to be made later is in the case is also an 
unknown. Who can predict how the case will develop? When the issue is 
ultimately litigated, the fact that the secured creditor may have failed to 
move for relief from the automatic stay strongly suggests the creditors 
made a determination about the benefit it would obtain from a 
bankruptcy sale, rather than from a state law foreclosure. In a 552(b) 
action, the question is what is equitable under the circumstances? This 
may not be extremely difficult determination in the type of case that is 
being addressed herein; a Chapter 11 case in which the secured creditors’ 
collateral is sold, the secured creditor is undersecured, and there are 
                                                          
70 See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 1106, 1107 (2010). 
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insufficient funds to pay administrative claims, unless the secured 
creditor is surcharged or its security interest in proceeds is limited 
according to the “equities of the case” in order to make assets available 
to pay administrative claims that would otherwise be unpaid. 
Granted, because the court will have to make an equitable 
determination and because the facts could be wide-ranging and complex, 
in some cases this factor could weigh in favor of an early settlement. 
However, in many cases, garden-variety bankruptcy litigation is 
much more complex than surcharge litigation or “equities of the case” 
litigation might be. In an every-day preference action,71 for example, the 
estate could have to establish the real (as opposed to book) value of its 
assets and liabilities as an element of its cause of action. In response to 
defenses, it may have to develop facts regarding the timing of its 
ordinary payments. Similarly, in a fraudulent conveyance action, the 
estate may have to prove the value of the company at a specific time in 
the past, the cash flow of the company at a specific time in the past, the 
capital needs of the debtor at some time in the past, and perhaps the fair 
market value of assets transferred.72 These fact-intensive issues are much 
more complex than the facts involved in a § 506(c) or § 552(b) action. 
Accordingly, this factor does not support granting a § 506(c) or § 552(b) 
waiver. 
C. The Expense, Inconvenience and Delay caused by 
the Litigation 
Any litigation can be expensive, inconvenient, and time 
consuming. However, because the facts needed for the litigation are less 
complex than the facts in a great deal of other bankruptcy litigation, this 
factor should not weigh heavily in favor of a settlement of § 506(c) or § 
552(b) issues at the outset of a case. Moreover, when an action to recover 
under sections §506(c) or § 552(b) is brought, the estate will typically 
have sold the bulk of its assets and be winding down. Accordingly, the 
litigation would not interfere with a reorganization of the debtor or 
distract management from its work in maximizing the value of the estate. 
For these reasons, this consideration does not support the estate granting 
a § 506(c) or § 552(b) waiver. 
D. The Paramount Interest of Creditors and Deference 
                                                          
71 See 11 U.S.C. § 547 for elements of and defenses to a preference action. 
72 See 11 U.S.C. § 548 for elements of and defenses to a fraudulent conveyance 
action brought under federal law. 
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to their Reasonable Views 
This factor also does not weigh heavily in support of the § 506(c) 
and § 552(b) waivers because those waivers are oftentimes approved in a 
final order within the first month of a Chapter 11 case. At that point, 
many creditors will not really understand the likely outcome of the case. 
Are these waivers merely theoretical, or are they likely to be a pivotal 
factor in shaping the Chapter 11 case? Accordingly, although the 
creditors’ opinions should be considered, the absence of an objection to 
any order containing these waivers should not be given much weight, 
especially when the papers filed do not really explain to creditors the 
possible practical impact of the waiver. 
Another reason that this factor should not lean in favor of the 
waivers is that the very creditors who would be most affected by the 
waivers—administrative creditors who may not yet have provided goods 
or services to the estate—do not exist in many cases at the very 
beginning of the case when these waivers are entered into. Rather, by 
definition their claims arrive during the administration of the case. 
But, you may reasonably think, a creditors’ committee likely has 
been appointed73 by the time the waivers are before the court, and 
committee counsel is typically extremely sophisticated in Chapter 11 
practice. That is true, but this point is undermined, at least optically, by 
the fact that the documents providing for the § 506(c) waiver also 
generally provide for a carve out for committee counsel that protects 
committee counsel—but not other administrative creditors—from 
administrative insolvency. More importantly, Chapter 11 cases can be 
extremely complicated, and even the most sophisticated committee 
counsel is just beginning to familiarize itself with the case during the first 
month of a case. 
There is, of course, the elephant in the room: the savvy secured 
creditor has provided its financing to the debtor or allowed for the use of 
its cash collateral with the caveat that it is a “take it or leave it deal” and 
if any of the questionable provisions in the financing or cash collateral 
order are not approved by the court, it will walk. The Court, Debtors’ 
counsel, and committee counsel are understandably extremely concerned 
for the innocent persons who would be severely damaged if the case 
were to get underway without necessary funding. For example, the estate 
would have no cash to pay outstanding claims of workers. Managers 
could be liable for tax claims. Vendors would fear doing business with 
the debtor, and the business could collapse, costing people their jobs and 
                                                          
73 11 U.S.C. §§ 1102, 1103 (2016). 
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contracting counterparties, whose contracts might be assumed, their 
livelihoods or their businesses. 
This is a valid concern and understandably professionals are 
driven to avoid an uncontrolled melt down and the carnage it could 
inflict on innocent parties. That being said, in many cases this fear 
amounts to the belief that the secured creditor’s position is that it will 
shoot itself in the head if it has to pay for the benefits it obtains from a 
Chapter 11 case. Would secured creditors really want to walk away from 
the going concern value of an enterprise because it may have to pay the 
costs of keeping it afloat? A secured creditor that is a regular in Chapter 
11 cases might walk away from the bargaining table once to bluff the 
bankruptcy bar into believing that it really will not finance a case without 
the 506(c) and 552 waivers, and that would be a terrible thing for the 
innocent parties, but the secured creditor might be reluctant to walk away 
a second time. 
Despite the breadth of case law holding that the debtors may 
settle claims only if the above criteria support the settlement, courts do 
not undertake this analysis in approving the 506(c) or 552(b) waivers at 
the outset of a case. I submit that if they did, they would not approve the 
waivers in cases that started off with any real chance of being 
administratively insolvent or in which the reason for being of the case is 
to allow the secured creditor to liquidate its collateral expeditiously in a 
going concern sale. 
But how is a court to know whether the case is designed to 
liquidate the collateral as a going concern? In many cases, that 
information should be easy to determine. The financing order will have a 
provision requiring the debtor to sell the collateral by a certain time. 
Therefore, the court will not have to guess about the secured party’s 
intentions. 
VI. A SECURED CREDITOR THAT SELLS ITS COLLATERAL IN A 
CHAPTER 11 GOING CONCERN SALE GENERALLY SHOULD 
BE SURCHARGED WHENEVER THE ESTATE IS 
ADMINISTRATIVELY INSOLVENT FOR THE COSTS OF THE 
ESTATE ADMINISTRATION 
I suggest that the secured creditor should be surcharged the 
reasonable costs of administration. Those expenses are, for the most part, 
by their very definition necessary.74 Many of them are, by definition, 
                                                          
74 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) (allowing as administrative expenses “actual, 
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reasonable.75 When the case is filed to liquidate the secured creditors’ 
collateral and not to confirm a reorganization plan, the case is, by 
definition, “for the benefit [of the holder] of the secured [claim].”76 
However, ultimately whether a case that is administratively 
insolvent is “for the benefit of the holder of the secured claim” also can 
be inferred from the actions of the secured creditor itself, because if it 
chooses not to bear those expenses, it can move to lift the automatic stay. 
It is the automatic stay that binds a secured creditor to Chapter 
11. Because of the automatic stay, a creditor cannot just take its collateral 
and foreclose under state law provisions. The court has to approve the 
creditor taking its collateral. But that approval should not be hard to 
obtain in an administratively insolvent case. 
Code section 362(d) allows a secured creditor to lift the stay for 
cause. In the case of a creditor seeking to lift the stay to foreclose on 
property, the Code explains that cause includes the situation in which the 
property is not necessary for a reorganization and the debtor has no 
equity in the property.77 In that case, the creditor has the right to a 
preliminary hearing in 30 days on its motion, and a final hearing on its 
motion in another 30 days.78 The debtor has the burden of proving that 
the property is necessary to an effective reorganization, and the secured 
creditor, which should be expert in valuing collateral, has the burden of 
proving that the estate has no equity in the collateral.79 
Of course, any interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code that may 
impose additional costs on secured creditors can be attacked on the 
ground that the interpretation will discourage secured lending, dry up 
sources of capital, and depress the economy. This is an important issue, 
but it is difficult to prove whether a proposal designed to protect 
creditors rather than the secured lender will discourage secured lending. 
The benefit of the approach proposed herein, however, is that it allows 
                                                                                                                                  
necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate”). 
75 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1)(A) (providing that compensation must be 
“reasonable.”); 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(2) (incorporating reasonableness requirement 
of 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1)(A)); 11 U.S.C. §§ 503(b)(3)-5 (requiring expenditures 
be reasonable). 
76 E.g., In re Cascade Hydraulics & Utility Service, Inc., 815 F.2d 546, 548 (9th 
Cir. 1987; In re Trim-X, Inc., 695 F.2d 296, 301 (7th Cir. 1982). 
77 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) (with respect to a request to lift the stay to foreclose on 
property, cause exists to grant the relief if “(A) the debtor does not have an 
equity in such property; and (B) the property is not necessary to an effective 
reorganization”). 
78 11 U.S.C. § 362(e) (2010). 
79 11 U.S.C. § 362(g). 
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undersecured lenders to obtain the full benefit of their bargain—state law 
foreclosure—but choose themselves whether they think their recovery 
will be enhanced by using a federal liquidation remedy and bearing the 
costs of that remedy. Because secured lenders are in the business of 
assessing the value of their collateral, and, in truth, should not be making 
secured loans if they are not extremely competent in assessing the value 
of the collateral securing their loans, they should be well situated to 
make that decision expeditiously. They are in a better position than 
typical administrative creditors, who may be involuntary creditors or 
have no relation with one creditor, to determine whether the Chapter 11 
case is worthwhile. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The LCI Holdings Case discussed above created a roadmap for 
secured creditors to gain the benefits of Chapter 11 to liquidate their 
collateral, while at the same time walking away from the administrative 
expenses of Chapter 11. Paradoxically, secured creditors now can use our 
federal judicial procedure—admired throughout the world—to 
shortchange the United States of the very taxes that support that 
procedure. Because the license to use and abuse Chapter 11 is relatively 
new, we do not yet know all the ways in which legitimate administrative 
debts will be avoided in the future. But we do know that because the § 
506(c) surcharge and § 552(b) “equity of the case” waivers are approved 
by the courts in the first month of many cases, the checks on abusive 
creditor action that Congress long ago inserted into the Code have been 
eviscerated. Courts should take a closer look at this DIP financing/cash 
collateral “boilerplate,” push back on these overreaching demands, and 
require secured creditors to pay-to-play if they want the benefits of 
Chapter 11. 
The position set forth in this article is not radical. In its 2014-
2015 ABI Commission to study the Reform of Chapter 11, the team of 
corporate lawyers leading the investigation concluded, albeit in a rather 
conclusory fashion, that “as with Section 506(c) and for similar reasons, 
the Commission voted to recommend that parties not be permitted” at the 
inception of a case80 to provide for a 552 waiver.  
In the almost-thirty years since the 1978 Code went into effect, a lot has 
changed in the world of commercial lending. Banks like the Bailey 
Building and Loan Society increasingly seem pigeonholed into reruns of 
                                                          
80 D.J. Baker, et al., American Bankruptcy Institute Commission to Study the 
Reform of Chapter 11, 2012-2014, 232-34 (AM. BANKR. INST 2014). 
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It’s a Wonderful Life that show up in the weeks before Christmas. 
Provisions that Congress, after great study and debate included in the 
Code to balance the power of secured and unsecured lenders, are 
disregarded, with little analysis, driven perhaps by a visceral fear that if 
the lenders terms are not met, beneficial sales that might save jobs will 
be impossible. But a visceral fear that, if the law is followed, the Code 
will fail to serve its rehabilitative purpose, is an insufficient justification 
for disregarding the Code’s plain language and the proof required to 
waive a valuable estate cause of action. Although this has been merely a 
preliminary discussion of the issues inspired by Professor Janger’s81 
discussion of the issues at the Akard lecture at the University of Texas, 
the importance of providing for a speedy waiver of an estate’s rights to 
benefit from those provisions deserves greater descriptive, empirical, and 
normative attention. 
  
                                                          
81 Janger, supra, note 37. 
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